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COMMENTS
FEDERAL COURTS-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY AND SECTION
1983-ENJOINING DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES OF JUDGES. O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), rev'g Littleton v. Berbling, 468
F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1972).
Respondents, seventeen black and two white citizens of
Cairo, Illinois, brought a class action for injunctive relief charging
the county magistrate and the associate judge of the county cir-
cuit court with depriving respondents and members of their class,
of rights secured by the first, sixth, eighth, thirteenth, and four-
teenth amendments to the United States Constitution and by 42
U.S.C. sections 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985(3).2 The complaint
1. The alleged class included:
all those who, on account of their race or creed and because of their exercise of
First Amendment rights, have [been] in the past and continue to be subjected
to the unconstitutional and selectively discriminatory enforcement and admin-
istration of criminal justice in Alexander County, [as well as financially poor
persons] who, on account of their poverty, are unable to afford bail, or are
unable to afford counsel and jury trials in city ordinance violation cases.
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 491 (1974).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed-
ings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exac-
tions of every kind, and no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970) provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise
on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose
of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory
from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal
protection of the laws; . . . in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if
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alleged that the petitioners engaged in a continuing pattern of
discriminatory conduct by imposing excessive and arbitrary
bonds and sentences and requiring that defendants pay for jury
trials.3 The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Illinois dismissed the case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction
to issue the injunctive relief sought and judicial immunity.4 In an
extensive opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that judicial
officers may be enjoined when a class discrimination is alleged.,
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
court of appeals and dismissed the action for failure to state a
case or controversy and for failure to state an adequate basis for
equitable relief.
The traditional doctrine of judicial immunity has shielded
judges from prosecution in England 7 for hundreds of years and in
this country since Bradley v. Fisher in 1871.1 In Bradley, the
one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in further-
ance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person
or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a
citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action
for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against
any one or more of the conspirators.
3. In February, 1973, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights published a study of this
situation, entitled "Cairo, Illinois: A Symbol of Racial Polarization." This study found:
Law enforcement in Cairo has been practiced in a discriminatory and com-
pletely unprofessional manner. Basic police services have been arbitrarily de-
nied to certain areas of the black community . . . and local law enforcement
officials have aligned themselves with individuals and groups whose purpose is
to oppose the enforcement of equal opportunity for all citizens regardless of race.
Kaplan, ALI/ABA Preview, Jan. 11,.1974, at 3. It was the situation described above,
respondents alleged, that led to the development of three patterns of judicial behavior that
favored the white citizens of Cairo. Respondents alleged that:
(1) petitioners set bond in criminal cases according to an unofficial bond sched-
ule without regard to the facts of a case or circumstances of an individual
defendant in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) "on
information and belief" they set sentences higher and impose harsher conditions
for respondents and members of their class than for white persons, and (3) they
require respondents and members of their class when charged with violations of
city ordinances which carry fines and possible jail penalties if the fine cannot
be paid, to pay for a trial by jury in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Four-
teenth Amendments.
414 U.S. 488, 492 (1974).
4. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 394-95 (7th Cir. 1972).
5. 468 F.2d 389. For analysis and discussion of Littleton, see 5 CONN. L. REv. 514
(1972); 41 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1806 (1972); 42 U. CiN. L. REv. 570 (1973).
6. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
7. For a discussion of the development of judicial immunity in England, see Bradley
v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
8. Id. 2
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United States Supreme Court held that "judges of courts of supe-
rior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their
judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdic-
tion, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly."'
The Court found three major justifications for upholding the doc-
trine of judicial immunity in the United States: (a) the desire to
avoid public degradation of the judiciary and the loss of respect
that would result from forcing judges to defend all of their deci-
sions, (b) the desire to avoid intimidation of the judiciary which
would result in a loss of independence, and (c) the fact that
procedures for removal of judges provided an adequate remedy for
the abuse of the judicial office."0 The exact extent of this immun-
ity from civil liability, however, has remained unsettled," and
only recently have any fixed dimensions been established. The
Supreme Court in Pierson v. Ray12 held unequivocally that judges
are immune from civil suits for damages brought against them for
acts committed within the scope of their judicial duties and res-
ponsibilities. The Pierson Court agreed with the doctrinal justifi-
cations enumerated in Bradley and also found that the normal
avenues of appeal were sufficient to vindicate any injury resulting
from abuse of judicial discretion.13 In O'Shea, the court of appeals
analyzed the doctrine of judicial immunity and concluded that
the original justifications outlined in Bradley and Pierson did not
preclude enjoining a judge pursuant to a civil rights action." The
Supreme Court reversed, and although it had an alternative
ground for overturning the decision, it also decided the question
of the sufficiency of respondents' request for injunctive relief.
This treatment can be viewed as a general, though somewhat
disguised, comment on the propriety of injunctive relief against
judges.
As the first ground for reversal, the Supreme Court held that
9. Id. at 351.
10. Id. at 347-49.
11. For a historical summary of judicial immunity cases, see Littleton v. Berbling,
468 F.2d at 404-06 (7th Cir. 1972).
12. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
13. Id. at 554.
14. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d at 407 (7th Cir. 1972). Judge Pell cited the lan-
guage in United States v. McLeod, 386 F.2d 734, 738 (5th Cir. 1967):
In Pierson v. Ray . . . the Supreme Court held that judges are immune
from liability for damages in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case does not,
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the respondents failed to allege an actual case or controversy.,5
The opinion cited the traditional criteria which must be met to
satisfy the case or controversy requirement: the necessity for a
"personal stake in the outcome,"' 6 allegations of "some threat-
ened or actual injury," 7 the presence of a "real and immediate"
injury as opposed to a "conjectural" or "hypothetical" one,'8 or
allegations that respondent has "sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury."' 9 Applying these criteria
to the complaint in O'Shea, the Court found that the respondents
alleged injury in only the most general terms,0 identifying no
15. 414 U.S. at 493. This holding was unexpected because neither party had argued
the case or controversy issue. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion, felt compelled to
comment:
The fact that no party has raised the issue in this closely contested case is
no barrier of course to our consideration of it. But the reasoning and result
reached by the Court are to say the least a tour de force and quite inconsistent
with the allegations in the complaint, which are within constitutional require-
ments.
Id. at 506.
16. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
17. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973).
18. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1969).
19. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
20. The Court could find no allegations of specific instances of misconduct in respon-
dents' complaint and rejected the allegations that were made as mere conclusory state-
ments into which the Court would "not strain to read inappropriate meaning." 414 U.S.
at 496. The majority repeatedly noted that the complaint made no reference to any named
respondent who was serving an allegedly illegal sentence handed down by petitioners,
standing trial before petitioners, or being threatened with trial before petitioners. The
Court rejected offers from respondents during oral argument to provide a list of names of
respondents who had previously suffered from petitioners' alleged unconstitutional prac-
tices. In examining respondents' charges of previous unconstitutional conduct, the Court
admitted that proof of past wrongs was "evidence bearing on whether there is a real and
immediate threat of repeated injury," but it concluded that under the circumstances the
prospect of any future injury was extremely questionable. Id. at 496-97. Such future injury
would hinge upon the probability that respondents would again be arrested, charged with
a violation of criminal law, and subjected to bond proceedings, trial, or sentencing before
petitioners. The Court particularly questioned the degree of such a probability in light of
the fact that respondents did not challenge the constitutionality of any state criminal
statute nor the exercise of any valid state criminal law. All of these factors, when taken
together, were viewed by the Court as presenting a less than certain probability that
respondents would appear before petitioners again. Such uncertainty, the Court con-
cluded, "takes us into the area of speculation and conjecture." Id. at 497. The majority
bolstered this conclusion by noting the deep involvement of respondents and members of
their class in attempts to eliminate racism in Cairo and assumed that "respondents will
conduct their activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction." Id.
The Court added that if respondents had attacked the constitutionality of any crimi-
nal laws, the speculative and conjectural nature of the allegations might still have been
fatal to the complaint. The situation in O'Shea was compared with that in Golden v.
Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), in which the complaint did challenge the constitutionality
4
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respondents who were serving illegal sentences, standing trial,
awaiting trial, or otherwise being exposed to any injury accompa-
nied by "continuing, present adverse effects.""1 The Court viewed
the respondents' allegations as entirely speculative and conjec-
tural in nature and therefore insufficient to state a justiciable
claim.
As a second ground for reversal, the Court held that respon-
dents failed to state an adequate basis for equitable relief." First,
the Court concluded that the relief sought constituted an imper-
missible intrusion by the federal court into state court proceed-
ings. The majority pointed to the basic doctrine of equity juris-
prudence, reaffirmed in Younger v. Harris,2 that "courts of eq-
uity should not act. . to restrain a criminal prosecution, when
the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not
suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.' 24 The O'Shea
Court found that the principles of equity, comity, and federalism
emphasized in Younger were developed in "recognition of the
need for a proper balance in the concurrent operation of federal
and state courts ' 25 and militated against wholesale federal inter-
vention in state court proceedings. 26 Referring to the fact that the
of a state criminal law. The Court found that where the sole justification for violating the
criminal law in question had disappeared, "it was wholly conjectural that another occa-
sion might arise where Zwickler might be prosecuted for distributing the handbills referred
to in the complaint." 394 U.S. at 109. After finding that the O'Shea complaint alleged no
imminent or threatened prosecutions, the Court concluded that, in the words of Boyle v.
Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 81 (1971), "the normal course of state criminal prosecutions cannot
be disrupted or blocked on the basis of charges which in the last analysis amount to
nothing more than speculation about the future." 414 U.S. at 498.
21. Id. at 495-96.
22. Id. at 499.
23. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
24. Id. at 43-44.
25. 414 U.S. at 499.
26. The need for such a federal non-intervention policy was also recognized by Con-
gress in passing the federal anti~injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). Section 2283
provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceed-
ings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
The Court rejected respondents' argument that the qualification of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as
an "expressly authorized" exception to the federal anti-injunction statute in Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), was indicative of an overriding federal interest in the protec-
tion of individual civil rights. The majority cited the limitation set out in Mitchum that
such "expressly authorized" exceptions were not intended by Congress to "question or
qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity and federalism." 414 U.S. at 499,
quoting 407 U.S. at 243.
5
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respondents did not seek to enjoin the enforcement of any state
statutes or "criminal prosecutions that might be brought under
a challenged [state] criminal law, '2 7 the Court foresaw an in-
junction that would operate only when the respondents and other
members of their class were the subjects of pending state prosecu-
tions. An injunction such as that recommended by the court of
appeals 2 would result in continued interruptions of state criminal
proceedings any time one of its beneficiaries charged non-
compliance on the part of the petitioners. The majority noted
that such challenges would require federal adjudication in so
many cases that the injunction would constitute "nothing less
than an ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings which
would indirectly accomplish the kind of interference that
Younger v. Harris . . . and related cases sought to prevent." 9
The Court also considered other problems inherent in proper su-
pervision of the suggested injunction, and noted especially the
absence of standards against which claims could be measured
and certain problems of proof in individual cases. The majority
concluded that, even without such problems,
such a major continuing intrusion of the equitable power of the
federal courts into the daily conduct of state criminal proceed-
ings is in sharp conflict with the principles of equitable restraint
which this Court has recognized in the decisions previously
noted.'
In its second objection to the respondents' request for an
27. 414 U.S. at 500.
28. Judge Pell, in recommending relief in Littleton, stated:
Obviously, since this case is before us on a motion to dismiss, it would be
improper for us to attempt to spell out in detail any relief the district court
might grant if the plaintiffs can prove what they allege. Nevertheless, as this
appears to be a case of first impression as to the type of relief approved, we feel
obligated to give the district court some guidelines as to what type of remedy
might be imposed. We do not mean to require the district court to sit in con-
stant, day-to-day supervision of either state court judges or the State's Attorney.
An initial decree might set out the general tone of rights to be protected and
require only periodic reports of various types of aggregate data on actions on bail
and sentencing and dispositions of complaints. Nevertheless, we have complete
confidence in the district court's ability to set up further guides as required and
if necessary to consider individual decisions. Difficulty of formulating a remedy
if a complaint is proved following a trial cannot be grounds for dismissing the
complaint ab initio.
468 F.2d at 414-15 (footnotes omitted).
29. 414 U.S. at 500.
30. Id. at 502.
(Vol. 26
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injunction, the Court found that the class had failed to establish
the basic requisites for equitable relief - "the likelihood of sub-
stantial and immediate irreparable injury and the inadequacy of
remedies at law." ' In its previous discussion of the case or contro-
versy issue, the majority had found that the respondents' injury
was speculative and conjectural as opposed to substantial, imme-
diate and irreparable. Citing this conclusion, the Court then
found that the normal state and federal remedies, such as substi-
tution of judges,3 2 change of venue, 33 direct appeal, post-
conviction collateral relief, suspension or removal of judges, 34 and
federal habeas corpus relief,35 were adequate to protect respon-
dents should they. be prosecuted, tried or sentenced by the peti-
tioners again. Additionally, the Court emphasized the criminal
remedy available under 18 U.S.C. section 242,36 quoting section
242 and citing a series of well-known cases applying it. 31 Only
then did the majority make its only direct reference to the judicial
immunity doctrine, stating, "[W]e have never held that the per-
formance of the duties of judicial, legislative, or executive officers
requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise criminal
deprivations of constitutional rights.""
In its discussion of judicial immunity, the court of appeals
had concluded that the Younger principles did not govern in the
O'Shea situation. It distinguished Younger on the principal
ground that the plaintiffs in O'Shea did not seek to enjoin state
criminal prosecutions, but rather sought to enjoin allegedly dis-
31. Id.
32. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-5 (1971).
33. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-6 (1971).
34. ILL. CONST., art. VI, § 15(e) (1970).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2251 (1970).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970) provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or
penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color,
or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death
results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
37. Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 830 (1966); United States v. Price, 383 U.S.
787, 793-94 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1966); Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-06 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); cf.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
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criminatory practices by judges.39 The court added that, even if
Younger did control, "plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to come
within the 'exceptional circumstances' test outlined [in
Youngerl." 410 Superficially, this distinction seems valid; the
O'Shea complaint did not point to any pending proceedings. The
absence of pending state proceedings is a significant factor in
determining the applicability of the Younger principles of equity,
comity, and federalism, and Supreme Court decisions subsequent
to Younger4' and O'Shea" have stated that, in the absence of such
proceedings, the Younger principles have "little force." 3 In the
Supreme Court's view, however, the equitable relief sought in
O'Shea was necessarily tied to state criminal proceedings.
What [respondents] seek is an injunction aimed at controlling
or preventing the occurrence of specific events that might take
place in the course of future state criminal trials. The order the
Court of Appeals thought should be available would be opera-
tive only where permissible state prosecutions are pending
against one or more of the beneficiaries of the injunction."
The Court's reading of the nature of the O'Shea injunctive relief
is logically correct. Since bonding, sentencing, and jury impanel-
ing occur only in the trial context, the judicial practices at issue
are inextricably part of criminal proceedings. Thus, the Younger
principles are unavoidably relevant and, under the Court's fur-
ther analysis, are inherently conflicting with the relief requested.
In rejecting the injunction outlined by the circuit court, the
Supreme Court did not suggest the type of equitable relief suffi-
ciently tailored to satisfy Younger. Whether, in fact, any tailoring
could be sufficient under the O'Shea facts is problematic. Re-
spondents did not seek to enjoin the enforcement of any specific
state statute; if such an injunction had been sought, the possibil-
ity of objectionable interference with state court proceedings
might have been eliminated. 5 The injunctive relief sought by the
39. 468 F.2d at 408.
40. Id.
41. Lake Carriers Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972).
42. Alilee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
43. Lake Carriers Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972).
44. 414 U.S. at 500 (emphasis added).
45. Federal intervention cases since Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), have con-
sistently dealt with constitutional challenges to state statutes. Those cases have held that
mere allegations of unconstitutionality are insufficient to warrant federal interference in
pending state proceedings. Rather, there must be indications that the statute is being
8
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O'Shea plaintiffs, however, was directed at judicial application of
valid state laws. In light of the fact that the O'Shea relief involved
specific practices of only two judges, it may be that the objection-
able element of the equitable relief sought was riot its scope but
its direction. Seemingly, it is the introduction of the element of
judicial performance which invokes Younger. This conclusion is
supported by the Court's reference to remedies, other than in-
junctions, available under state and federal law. The Court's dis-
cernible emphasis on 18 U.S.C. section 242 as an alternative rem-
edy can be interpreted as a suggestion that the acceptable relief
in the O'Shea situation is legal rather than equitable.
The O'Shea holding may be illustrative of the Burger Court's
restrictions on the availability of federal injunctive relief when
such relief is perceived as interfering with state criminal proceed-
ings.4" The standards for federal equitable relief established by
the Warren Court in Dombrowski v. Pfister47 were significantly
narrowed in a series of Burger Court decisions." As a further
enforced in bad faith for the purpose of harassment, that the statute is patently unconsti-
tutional on its face, that its enforcement would lead to a multiplicity of suits, or that, for
some other reason, the state furnishes an inadequate forum for the vindication of constitu-
tional rights. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
46. See Kennedy & Schoonover, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Under the
Burger Court, 26 Sw. L.J. 282 (1972).
47. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
48. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971);
Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein,
401 U.S. 200 (1971); and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). See also Golden v.
Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969).
In the article by Kennedy & Schoonover, supra note 46, the authors reached the
following conclusion:
The message from the Supreme Court's February sextet is clear: After
Dombrowski the pendulum of federal intervention in state court proceedings
swung too far; it is time for a new balance to be struck. The new balance finds
a substantially restricted Dombrowski doctrine operating in an atmosphere de-
signed to encourage the most friction-free federal-state relationship. Although
many questions remain for the lower courts after the Younger series concerning
the precise future of Dombrowski and other theories of equitable relief in the
federal courts, the sextet itself settled beyond dispute certain ambiguities in
Dombrowski.
(1) The Dombrowski doctrine does not permit federal injunctive relief
against pending state proceedings brought to enforce unconstitutionally vague
or overbroad statutes regulating expression in the absence of a showing of bad
faith prosecution, harrassment, or other extraordinary circumstances.
(2) The Dombrowski doctrine does not confer standing to challenge a state
statute regulating expression upon those whose only injury or threat of injury is
a general feeling of inhibition derived from the mere presence of an unconstitu-
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extension of the Younger rationale, the O'Shea decision may jeop-
ardize the future of the judicial immunity doctrine. The practical
effect of O'Shea is to uphold the immunity of judges from all suits
for "broad" injunctive relief. As presently framed by O'Shea,
however, this immunity is found, not under the traditional justifi-
cations cited in Bradley v. Fisher," but under the umbrella of the
Younger principles. O'Shea, while revealing the majority's incli-
nation, does not foreclose the approval of injunctive relief against
state judges in all circumstances." If confronted with a precise
request for equitable relief that would not result in a general
interference with state criminal proceedings, the Court may find
itself forced either to accede to plaintiff's request or to forge a
broader doctrine than the holding of either Pierson v. Ray or
O'Shea and declare absolute judicial immunity from all civil ac-
tions.
49. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
50. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973). Gibson can be read as indicating
that a major shortcoming of the O'Shea complaint was its failure to allege demonstrably
objective evidence of specific bias on the part of petitioners. Had respondents so alleged,
the Court might have held the petitioners "incompetent by reason of bias to adjudicate
the issues pending before [them]," thereby removing the basis for invoking Younger. Id.
at 577.
See also Helfant v. Kugler, 500 F.2d 1188 (3rd Cir. 1974), in which the court held that
a plaintiff may be entitled to declaratory relief if he proves judicial bias.
51. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
[Vol. 26
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VENUE-VENUE SANCTUARY OF NATIONAL BANKS-THE PROPER
CONSTRUCTION OF 12 U.S.C. SECTION 94 PLACES THE VENUE OF Ac-
TIONS AGAINST A NATIONAL BANK IN ANY COUNTY IN WHICH THE BANK
OPERATES A BRANCH OFFICE. Central Bank, National Association
v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 962, 106 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1973).
Two groups of plaintiffs, alleging that they were victims of a
fraudulent "investment conspiracy" and purchasers of overval-
ued limited partnership interests in apartment house develop-
ments, filed separate suits in the Superior Court of Sacramento
County, California. Each group of plaintiffs joined as a co-
defendant Central Bank, a national bank with main office and
principal place of business in Alameda County and a branch
office in Sacramento County. Central Bank's main office in Ala-
meda County had originally financed construction of the apart-
ment houses and had held first deeds of trust and assignments of
rent as security. In the action against the bank and the other
defendants, the plaintiffs sought receiverships, restraint on the
exercise of default privileges, rescission of their purchase of par-
ticipating interests, adjudication of title to the property, and gen-
eral and punitive damages. Central Bank claimed a federal venue
privilege under section 94 of the National Bank Act' and moved
1. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1970). Section 94 of the National Bank Act provides:
Actions and proceedings against any association under this chapter may be
had in any district or Territorial court of the United States held within the
district in which such association may be established, or in any State, county,
or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located
having jurisdiction in similar cases.
This section is derived from the National Bank Act of February 25, 1863, ch. 58, § 59, 12
Stat. 681, which provided
that suits, actions, and proceedings by and against any association under this
act may be had in any circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States
held within the district in which such association may be established.
This act was amended by the National Bank Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 57, 13 Stat.
116-17 which added the phrase, "or in any state, county, or municipal court in the county
or city in which said association is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases ...... The
National Bank Act of February 18, 1875, ch. 80, § 5198, 18 Stat. 320, adopted § 57 of the
previous act virtually verbatim. A compilation of the pertinent national bank legislation
appears in the appendices to Merchantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 567-72
(1963).
Although the language of section 94 could be viewed as permissive, it is now settled
that the operation of the venue provision is mandatory. Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Lang-
deau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963). In applying the provision, the courts have defined the terms
"established" and "located" interchangeably. Reaves v. Bank of America, 352 F. Supp.
745, 747 (S.D. Cal. 1973); but see, Security Mills v. Wachovia Bank & Trust, 281 N.C.
525, 189 S.E.2d 266 (1972), which concluded that since the two different terms were used,
643 11
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for changes of venue in both cases to Alameda County on the
ground that, for venue purposes, the bank was "located" only at
the principal place of business specified in its charter. The trial
court denied the motions. In a consolidation of the two proceed-
ings, the California Court of Appeal for the Third District af-
firmed, holding that the proper construction of section 94 places
the venue of actions against a national bank in any county in
which it operates a branch office for the conduct of its general
banking business.'
The present statute authorizing nationally chartered banks
was derived from the National Bank Act of 1864. 3 Section 8 of
that act provided that the "usual business" of a nationally char-
tered bank "shall be transacted at an office or banking house
located in the place specified in its organization certificate. ' 4
Courts interpreted the statute as providing that the business of
national banks was to be conducted only at the place specified
in its organization charter. Relying on this construction, courts
likewise limited venue to the location of the principal place of
business.'
With the passage of the McFadden Act in 1927, 7 national
banks obtained authority to establish branch offices within the
limits of the locality specified in the charter certificate. A 1933
amendment authorized national banks to establish and operate
branches at any point within the state, provided such establish-
ment and operation complied with state regulation of state
the presumption is that Congress intended the terms to have different connotations and,
therefore, intended to have different rules applied to suits brought in federal and state
courts.
2. 30 Cal. App. 3d 962, 106 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1973).
3. 13 Stat. 99, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 38 (1970).
4. Note, An Assault on the Venue Sanctuary of National Banks, 34 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 765, 767 (1966), citing 13 Stat. 102 (1864). This note is a valuable summary of the
evolution of both modem banking practices and the laws related to banking.
5. See First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 657-58 (1924); 29 Ops. Att'y Gen.
81(1911).
6, First Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141, 144-45 (1889); Reaves v. Bank of
America, 352 F. Supp. 745, 747 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
7. 44 Stat. 1228 (1927), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970). The act also amended
§ 8 to read:
The general business of each national banking association shall be transacted
in the place specified in its organization certificate and in the branch or
branches, if any, established or maintained by it in accordance with the provi-
sions of section 36 of this title.
44 Stat. 1229 (1927), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 81 (1970).
[Vol. 26
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banks.' The McFadden Act and the existence of branch banking
by national banks9 presented courts with the opportunity to ex-
pand the meaning of the terms "located" and "established" to
allow a national bank to be sued not only at the place specified
in its organization certificate, but also at any places where it
operated branches for the conduct of general banking business."0
This statutory construction, however, was not forthcoming. In
1936, the Second Circuit in Leonardi v. Chase National Bank"
held that a national bank is not "established" in every district
in which it has a branch bank and that it may be sued in federal
court only in the district in which it has its principal place of
business as stated in its charter.'2 Subsequent cases in lower fed-
eral courts have adhered to the Leonardi holding,' 3 but the Su-
preme Court has not ruled on whether a national bank may be
"located" or "established" at a place other than the place speci-
fied in its charter.'
4
Rejecting prior case law, the court in Central Bank, National
Association v. Superior Court'5 made a frontal assault on the
generally accepted interpretation of section 94. Viewing the issue
8. 48 Stat. 189 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970). The provision authorized
national banks to establish branches in states in which state banks were so authorized.
The purpose of this provision was to make national banks competitive with state banks.
Rushton ex rel. Comm'r of Banking Dept. v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 298 Mich. 417, 299
N.W. 129 (1941).
9. See Note, An Assault on the Venue Sanctuary of National Banks, supra note 4, at
767, 772.
10. Id. at 769.
11. 81 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 677 (1936).
12. Id. at 22. For a more complete analysis of the ruling in Leonardi and the cases
that Leonardi relied upon, see Note, An Assault on the Venue Sanctuary of National
Banks, supra note 4, at 769-71. The authors criticize the decision for relying on cases
decided prior to the 1927 and 1933 amendments which authorized national banks to
establish branches.
13. United States Nat'l Bank v. Hill, 434 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1970); American Surety
Co. v. Bank of Cal., 133 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1943); Reaves v. Bank of America, 352 F. Supp.
745 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
14. In Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963), the Court held that
a national bank may be sued in state court only in the county in which the bank is located.
In that case, however, the Court did not address the precise issue of where a national bank
is "located" or "established."
In Helco, Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 470 F.2d 883, 884 (3rd Cir. 1972), the court
cited Langdeau in support of the contention that section 94 requires that national banks
*be sued only in the district in which they are chartered and have their principal place of
business. Langdeau does not stand for any definition of "located" or "established" and
to cite the case as standing for that definition is to be in error.
15. 30 Cal. App. 3d 962, 106 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1973).
13
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from a historical perspective, the court emphasized that the origi-
nal concern of the venue provision was the physical location of the
banking business. The limitation of venue to charter designation
was therefore logical when physical location was restricted by
statute. Subsequent statutory authorization to expand physical
location, however, vitiated this logic; adherence to what the
Central Bank court termed the "synthetic charter designation""8
obscured the proper venue considerations.'7
The court in Central Bank also considered the effect of
branch banking on the policy reasons which supposedly justified
the restricted venue requirement. When national banks were lim-
ited to one location, this policy was predicated on convenience;
it avoided the disruption of business which could result from
banks being forced to send records to distant forums. When a
bank spreads its general banking business throughout the state,
and necessarily decentralizes its records-keeping operations, the
Central Bank court reasoned "the possibilities of harassment
dwindle and disappear."'8 Moreover, the court noted, the current
judicial construction of the venue provision afforded banks with
a "tactical weapon" when lawsuits arose from business transac-
tions at the branch.'" Summarizing its criticism of the Leonardi
rule, the court stated:
The Leonardi case and its progeny . . . fail to recognize that
location of the banking business, not location of headquarters,
is the venue statute's prime concern, fail to appraise the statute
in the light of the associated legislation enacted in 1927 ....
They frustrate congressional intent to allow national banks to
be sued where they establish their banking business. 0
On this basis, the Central Bank court held that, under the proper
construction of section 94, a national bank is "located" and may
be sued in any county in which it has a branch bank.
Dissatisfaction with the generally accepted construction of
section 94 is neither novel nor eccentric. The most recent articles
on the subject are in agreement in their denunciation of the
16. Id. at 969, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 917.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 970, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 917.
19. Id. Plaintiffs with small claims might be deterred from litigating by the prospect
of pursuing banks to distant forums.
20. Id. at 970-71, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
14
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Leonardi rule21 and the American Law Institute has proposed that
section 94 be repealed. 2 The most vocal defender of the current
construction of section 94 is the Comptroller of the Currency, who
maintains that the proposed liberalization of the venue privilege
would "hamper the supervisory activities of his office and the
operations of the national banking system. ' 23 The validity of the
Comptroller's argument appears questionable, however, because
banks often decline to invoke the venue privilege. 24 Courts have
historically implied dissatisfaction with the restrictive interpreta-
tion of section 94 by developing exceptions designed to circum-
vent the harshness of the rule, holding that certain activities on
the part of the bank constitute a waiver of the venue privilege25
21. See Note, An Assault on the Venue Sanctuary of National Banks, supra note 4.
The author's analysis of the history and policy of the venue provision of the National Bank
Act is clearly a major source for the court in Central Bank. See Central Bank, Nat'l Ass'n
v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d at 968 n.7, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 916 n.7. See also Comment,
Restricted Venue in Suits against National Banks: A Procedural Anachronism, 14 Win. &
MARY L. REv. 179 (1973).
22. According to the A.L.I., "There is no obvious reason why a national bank requires
a unique and restrictive venue rule, and cannot be treated as is any other corporation for
purposes of venue." A.L.I., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JulusoicrON BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 77 (1969). The Institute offers an alternative statute should repeal be
unacceptable:
Actions and proceedings against any association under this chapter may be
had in any district or Territorial court of the United States held within the
district in which such association may be established, or, if the action arises out
of business transacted in this district, in any district in which the association
has a branch office ... or, if the action arises out of business transacted in that
county or city, in any county or city in which the association has a branch office.
Actions and proceedings against more than one association may be had in any
district or Territorial court of the United States or State, county, or municipal
court in which the action might have been brought against any one of the
associations.
Id. at 34-35 (emphasis omitted).
23. Comment, Restricted Venue in Suits against National Banks: A Procedural An-
achronism, supra note 21, at 190, citing Memorandum of the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 14, General Elec. Credit Corp. v. James Talcott, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 699
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
24. See, e.g., Reaves v. Bank of America, 352 F. Supp. 745, 749 (S.D. Cal. 1973), in
which the court noted that not only had the defendant bank availed itself of the court as
plaintiff 105 times, but also that it had been sued 338 times without once raising a venue
objection. Another argument offered is that since the Comptroller is able to regulate the
multi-district business transactions of banks, it should be possible for him to regulate the
records of those dealings, especially when it is shown that records are at the place of the
transaction rather than the main office. Note, An Assault on the Venue Sanctuary of
National Banks, supra note 4, at 773.
25. First Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141 (1889); Buffum v. Chase Nat'l Bank,
192 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 944 (1952); Frankford Supply Co. v.
15
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and that certain actions are local in nature, rather than transi-
tory,2 and therefore not governed by section 94.27 The reluctance
of the courts prior to Central Bank to challenge directly Leonardi
may not have represented adherence to the principle of stare
decisis as much as it indicated the belief that any change in the
construction of section 94 must come from Congress. 2 The court
in Central Bank refused to subscribe to this judicial hesitancy."
The decisional rationale of the court in Central Bank is sup-
ported by parallel developments in the judicial interpretation of
venue provisions for corporations. In 1939, the Supreme Court in
Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp."0 confronted a chal-
lenge to the long-settled construction of the venue provision of the
Judicial Code which applied to actions brought against foreign
corporations.' Section 51 provided that venue was proper only in
Mattes, 305 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Lapinsohn v. Lewis Charles, Inc., 212 Pa.
Super. 185, 240 A.2d 90 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952 (1968).
26. Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S. 66 (1880); Continental Nat'l Bank v. Folsom, 78 Ga.
449, 3 S.E. 269 (1887).
27. For more complete discussions of the waiver theory and the local action exception,
see Note, An Assault on the Venue Sanctuary of National Banks, supra note 4, and
Comment, Restricted Venue in Suits Against National Banks: A Procedural Anachron-
ism, supra note 21.
Although these two approaches have offered some relief to plaintiffs in the past, their
present status is uncertain and they are insufficient to ameliorate the harshness of the
rule. The local action exception is inherently limited to a particular type of action in which
the plaintiff seeks adjudication of interests in property. Also, the validity of the exception
may be questionable. See Comment, Restricted Venue in Suits against National Banks:
A Procedural Anachronism, supra note 21, at 182 n.13. The uncertainty of the wavier
exception is evidenced by Helco, Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 470 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1972),
which reversed the lower court and held that a national bank does not waive its venue
privilege by establishing a branch bank and conducting general banking business at the
branch.
28. See, e.g., United States Nat'l Bank v. Hill, 434 F.2d 1019, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 1970),
in which the court, commenting on the district court's refusal to transfer venue from a
branch location to the main office, stated: "The decision reached by the district judge may
reflect the more desirable position, but if national banks and the courts are to be placed
in that position, it must be Congress that puts them there."
29. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 971 n.12, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 918 n.12. The court quoted Justice
Traynor's statement:
It is ironic that an unsound interpretation of a statute should gain strength
merely because it has stood unnoticed by the legislature. It is a might assump-
tion that legislative silence means applause. It is much more likely to mean
ignorance or indifference.
Id., citing Traynor, Symposium on Law Reform, The Courts: Interweavers in the Reforma-
tion of the Law, 32 SASK. L. Rev. 201, 211 (1967).
30. 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
31, 24 Stat. 552 (1887), as corrected, 25 Stat. 433 (1888), 28 U.S.C. § 112 (1934). This
act has been replaced by 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1970).
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the district in which either party resided.32 The Court, departing
from previous decisions which had held that suit could be brought
against a corporation only in the state of its charter,33 ruled that
the appointment of an agent was an effective consent by the
corporation to be sued in that district. 4 Although the decision
was based on a theory of waiver of a privilege, Neirbo effectively
destroyed the privilege itself by making a corporation a "resi-
dent" of each state in which the corporation abides by state law
and appoints an agent.3 5 Neirbo, despite the absence of congres-
sional action, attributed a new effect to the statute. The ruling
clearly supports the argument that, in determining questions of
venue, courts are competent to interpret statutory provisions in
a manner which will ameliorate harshness, resolve inequities, and
meet more realistically the goals of convenience and fairness
which the statute seeks to achieve."
More recently, in Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad
Co. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,37 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the power of the courts to construe venue provisions.
The issue in that case was the proper venue in a suit against an
unincorporated association. The Court held that, for purposes of
venue, unincorporated associations are to be treated like corpora-
tions and are thus subject to suit where they are doing business.
38
32. Id. The original statute provided that "where jurisdiction is founded only on the
fact that the action is between citizens of different states, suit shall be brought only in
the district of residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant."
Congress had amended the provision in 1887, deleting from the provision's predeces-
sor a clause which allowed suit to be brought not only at the defendant's residence, but
also wherever he could be "found." The apparent purpose of the amendment had been to
limit the available forums in most cases involving foreign defendants, individual and
corporate. The practical effect had been to provide a kind of corporate immunity to suit
when business was conducted by a foreign corporation. See Comment, Venue of Actions
against Foreign Corporations in the Federal Courts, 53 HARv. L. REv. 660, 665 (1939),
citing In re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U.S. 221 (1895); Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P.
Lorillard Co., 287 F. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
33. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 U.S. 202 (1892); Shaw v. Quincy Mining
Co., 145 U.S. 444 (1892).
34. 308 U.S. 165 (1939). For more complete analyses of Neirbo, see Note, Venue of
Actions against Foreign Corporations in the Federal Courts, supra note 32; Comment,
Corporations-Jurisdiction-Foreign Corporations anid Venue in the Federal
Courts-Consent to be Sued, 38 MICH. L. REv. 1047 (1940).
35. See Note, Venue of Actions against Foreign Corporations in the Federal Courts,
supra note 32, at 663-65.
36. Id. at 665, 666.
37. 387 U.S. 556 (1967).
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The association had argued that if Congress had intended to ex-
pand the residency of unincorporated associations to the same
extent it had expanded corporation residence, it would have done
so. The Court, however, rejected this argument and noted that
sound policy considerations dictated in favor of treating unincor-
porated associations as corporations for purposes of venue, even
in the absence of congressional action."5 Significantly, the Court's
ruling in Denver Railroad, unlike that in Neirbo, was not based
in any fashion upon a waiver or consent theory.
A judicial liberalization of venue provisions neither enlarges
nor expands the jurisdiction of the court.4 0 The effect of venue
liberalization is not an increase of the case load of the courts, but
a redistribution of cases already within the court's jurisdiction to
more convenient and appropriate forums. As the Court stated in
Neirbo, "This basic difference between the court's power [to
adjudicate] and the litigant's convenience is historic in the fed-
eral courts." 4' It appears, therefore, that the California Court of
Appeal in Central Bank has neither abused judicial authority nor
illegitimately invaded the field of the legislature in re-examining
and redefining the venue provision of the National Bank Act.
Under the Leonardi rule, plaintiffs required to bring the ac-
tion in the home office of national banks often faced great incon-
venience and prohibitive expense in the maintenance of the ac-
tion. It is not unreasonable to assume that such inconvenience
and expense often forced plaintiffs to forego their actions.2 The
to the district of the defendant's residence, whether the defendant was an individual, a
corporation, or an unincorporated association. Id. at 558. In 1948, however, Congress
adopted 28 U.S.C. 1391(c) which defined corporate residency as the place the corporation
is incorporated, licensed to do business, or is doing business.
39. The Court stated:
We think it most nearly approximates the intent of Congress to recognize the
reality of the multi-state, unincorporated association such as a labor union and
to permit suit against that entity, like the analogous corporate entity, wherever
it is "doing business."
387 U.S. at 562.
40. See United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965), in which the
Court refused to extend corporation citizenship to an unincorporated labor union for the
purpose of diversity jurisdiction. Without dissent, the Court ruled that any such extension
must come from Congress, not the courts.
41. 308 U.S. at 168.
42. See, e.g., Reaves v. Bank of America, 352 F. Supp. 745, 750 (S.D. Cal. 1973);
Note, An Assault on the Venue Sanctuary of National Banks, supra note 4, at 774;
Comment, Restricted Venue in Suits against National Banks: A Procedural Anachronism,
supra note 21, at 179-80.
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more liberal rule of Central Bank would alleviate these problems.
In this age of inexpensive long distance telephone rates, compu-
terized records, and simplified methods of duplicating docu-
ments, neither a national bank's records nor the ordinary opera-
tion of the bank are likely to be disrupted to any great extent.43
Furthermore, when a branch bank is alien to a transaction, it
may, as the court in Central Bank noted, invoke general venue
statutes." Another consequence of the Leonardi rule which would
be avoided by adoption of the Central Bank rule is the great
difficulty plaintiffs face in attempting to join national banks as
co-defendants. The Leonardi result often inconveniences plain-
tiffs who may be effectively foreclosed from reaching all parties,
and it burdens courts which may be forced to hear several suits
rather than one.45
The rule adopted in Central Bank that a national bank is
"located" and may be sued in any county where it has a branch
bank is more liberal than the statute proposed by the American
Law Institute;" the court in Central Bank found that venue may
be proper even though the transaction involved did not occur at
the branch location. The Central Bank holding focuses on the
convenience of forum for parties and witnesses, and thus provides
a more realistic inquiry into the policy reasons underlying the
venue provision. Moreover, recognizing branch banking as a con-
temporary reality, Central Bank restores a logical pari materia
construction of venue and location statutes governing national
banks.
43. See, e.g., Bruns, Nordeman & Co. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 F.2d
300, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968); Helco, Inc. v. First Nat'l City
Bank, 333 F. Supp. 1289, 1292 (D.V.I. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 470 F.2d 883 (3d Cir.
1972); Note, An Assault on the Venue Sanctuary of National Banks, supra note 4, at 772
n.65; Comment, Restricted Venue in Suits against National Banks: A Procedural Anach-
ronism, supra note 21, at 190.
44. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 970 n.11, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 918 n.11.
45. See Bruns, Nordeman & Co. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 F.2d 300,
302-04 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968).
46. See note 22 supra. However, the rule is in accord with the Institute's principal
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